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SETTING A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF KENTUCKY COURTS’ PUBLIC POLICY 
EXCEPTION TO CONFLICTS-OF-LAW JURISPRUDENCE 
 




In resolving contractual disputes in which the contract or the contracting parties 
are connected to multiple states, courts are often charged with the daunting task of 
determining which state’s law provides the proper avenue for handling the dispute. 
In Kentucky, courts generally follow the Restatements (Second) of Conflicts of Laws 
“most significant relationship” test.2  
The most significant relationship test instructs courts to consider several factors: 
the place of formation of the contract; the place where the contract was or is to be 
performed; the physical location, if any, of the contract’s subject matter; as well as 
the domicile, residence, and/or place of business of the contracting parties.3 The idea 
is for these factors, taken together, to provide a defendable means for Kentucky 
courts to determine which state has the “most significant relationship to the 
transaction and the parties,” and, consequently, which state’s law should govern the 
contractual dispute.4 
But even if the application of the most significant relationship test clearly 
identifies a state other than Kentucky as the state with the most significant 
relationship to the transaction and the parties, Kentucky courts will nevertheless 
refuse to apply the law of that state if doing so would violate a well-established public 
policy of the Commonwealth.5 Notably, however, Kentucky courts will invoke this 
public policy exception to the most significant relationship test only for the 
protection of a Kentucky resident. As Justice Abramson once wrote for the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky, the public policy exception requires a “well-founded rule of 
domestic policy established to protect the morals, safety, or welfare of our people.”6 
The court emphasized that “[w]here no Kentucky resident has been affected, rarely 
will that standard be met.”7 
This Note explores the constitutionality of Kentucky courts’ refusal to extend the 
public policy exception to nonresidents who properly bring suit in Kentucky. Part I 
employs case law examples to illustrate how Kentucky courts routinely apply the 
 
I J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky J. David Rosenberg College of Law (2021).  
2 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hodgkiss-Warrick, 413 S.W.3d 875, 878 (Ky. 2013) 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §188(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
3 Id. at 878–79. 
4 Id. at 878 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §188(1) (AM. L. INST. 1977)). 
5 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marley, 151 S.W.3d 33, 35 (Ky. 2004).  
6 Hodgkiss-Warrick, 413 S.W.3d at 882 (quoting R.S. Barbee & Co. v. Bevins, Hopkins & Co. 195 
S.W. 154, 155 (Ky. 1917)). 
7 Id.; see also Marley, 151 S.W.3d at 42 (Cooper, J., dissenting) (“Kentucky has no interest in 
applying our public policy to provide benefits to Indiana residents who would not be entitled to them 
under Indiana law.”). 
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public policy exception for the protection of Kentucky residents, and it traces the 
historical trend of Kentucky courts toward denying the public policy exception to 
nonresidents. Part II analyzes the constitutionality of Kentucky courts’ application 
of the public policy exception under the Equal Protection Clause. Part III examines 
the constitutionality of Kentucky courts’ application of the public policy exception 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Part IV provides a brief synopsis of the 
reasons why Kentucky should apply the public policy exception equally to all 
persons within its boundaries, regardless of residency.   
 
I. THE CASE LAW 
 
Recently, the public policy exception was used for the protection of a Kentucky 
resident in the case Woods v. Standard Fire Insurance Company.8 In Woods, a 
Kentucky resident was gravely wounded in a car crash on a Kentucky roadway.9 
Woods, the Kentucky resident, acquired medical charges surpassing $250,000.10 
During the collision, Woods was operating her father’s car, a resident of 
Connecticut.11 The car was insured by Standard Fire, a Connecticut insurance 
company with its principal place of business in Connecticut.12 Under the terms of the 
policy, Woods’ father was the named insured and Woods was in no way covered.13  
The other motorist in the collision was insured by United States Automobile 
Association (USAA).14 Woods settled her tort claim with USAA for $50,000.15 
Woods obtained $11,000 in “UIM benefits” from Standard Fire, the insurer of her 
father’s vehicle, and requested an additional $100,000 in UIM benefits from the 
company.16 The Standard Fire policy contained a set-off provision which lowered its 
“limit of liability . . . by all sums” paid by other parties possibly “legally responsible” 
for collisions causing physical damage.17  
Under Connecticut law, where such provisions are enforceable, this clause would 
reduce (“set-off”) Woods’ $100,000 UIM payment from Standard Fire by $61,000, 
the total amount previously received from USAA and Standard Fire.18 Under 
Kentucky law, however, such set-off provisions are not enforceable as against public 
policy and would therefore not reduce Woods’ total amount recoverable by the prior 
amounts received.19 Consequently, the case turned on whether Connecticut law or 
Kentucky law governed the interpretation of the policy.20  
 
8 Woods v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 411 F. Supp. 3d 397, 406 (E.D. Ky. 2019).  
9 Id. at 399.  
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 400.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 399.  
15 Id. at 400. 
16 Id. 
17 Id.  
18 Id. at 400–01. 
19 Id. at 401.  
20 Id.  
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Despite its conclusion that the application of the most significant relationship test 
weighed in favor of applying Connecticut law, the court nevertheless held that the 
public policy exception required application of Kentucky law to the insurance 
policy.21 The court “acknowledge[d] that application of the public policy exception 
in this case swallows the most significant relationship test analysis, which points in 
favor of application of Connecticut law.”22 But the court reasoned that Kentucky 
state courts have “demonstrated a willingness to disregard the most significant 
relationship test” when its application would clearly violate the public policy of 
Kentucky.23  
Although the court made no comment of the fact that it was disregarding another 
state’s substantive law for the protection of a Kentucky resident, as opposed to a non-
resident, this decision is consistent with the pattern of Kentucky courts only applying 
the public policy exception if a Kentucky resident stands to benefit. 
A similar example reflecting this pattern is found in the case of Schardein v. State 
Auto Insurance Company.24 Schardein involved an automobile accident on a 
Kentucky roadway between a Kentucky resident and another driver.25 The Kentucky 
resident, a 19-year-old, was killed in the collision.26 The decedent’s estate moved 
against the uninsured motorist policy of his father, an Indiana resident insured by 
State Auto.27 Similar to the insurance policy in Woods, the policy issued by State 
Farm to the decedent’s father contained a set-off provision which reduced the 
payments receivable from State Farm by all other amounts paid by other parties as a 
result of the collision.28  
The decedent’s estate conceded that under Kentucky’s traditional conflict of laws 
analysis Indiana law would apply, but nevertheless argued that Kentucky law should 
apply under the public policy exception.29 The court agreed.30 Despite the fact that 
the named policy holders were both Indiana residents, the court held that the 
decedent was a resident of Kentucky and therefore his estate was “entitled to the 
protection of Kentucky’s laws.”31  
 
A. THE UNFOLLOWED EXCEPTION 
 
State Farm v. Marley appears to be the only case in which the Kentucky Supreme 
Court applied the public policy exception for the protection of a nonresident of 
 
21 Id. at 405–06.   
22 Id. at 405. 
23 Id. 
24 Schardein v. State Auto. Ins. Co., No. 12-288-C, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180746, at *4–5 (W.D. 
Ky. Dec. 20, 2012). 
25 Id. at *1. 
26 Id.  
27 Id. at *2. 
28 Id. at *2–3. 
29 Id. at *3–4. 
30 Id. at *6. 
31 Id. at *4. 
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Kentucky,32 but that opinion has not been followed and was later implicitly rejected 
by the Kentucky Supreme Court itself.33  
In Marley, an Indiana resident fell asleep behind the wheel and lost control of his 
vehicle while driving through Kentucky with his family.34 The driver of the vehicle 
had a personal liability umbrella insurance policy issued in Indiana.35 The driver’s 
injured family members, all of which were Indiana residents, subsequently filed a 
personal injury claim against the driver in Kentucky.36 The driver’s insurer 
contended that a household exclusion provision within the policy was valid and 
enforceable and therefore prevented the family members from recovering against the 
driver’s policy.37  
In finding that such provisions clearly violated the public policy of Kentucky, the 
court held the household exclusion provision void and unenforceable as applied to 
the automobile liability coverage.38 The court reasoned that it is clear public policy 
of Kentucky “to ensure that victims of motor vehicle accidents on Kentucky 
highways are fully compensated.”39 The majority opinion made no distinction 
between residents and non-residents in holding the household exclusion provision 
unenforceable as against public policy.40  
Despite the majority’s constitutionally-compliant opinion, the dissenting opinion 
has since become the prevailing view of the Commonwealth.41 The dissent takes the 
position that it is illogical for Kentucky courts to apply Kentucky’s public policy 
exception in a way that would “provide rights to nonresidents to which they are not 
entitled under the law of their home state.”42 Because all of the parties to this action 
were residents of Indiana, the dissent contends, Indiana law should govern the 
interpretation of the policy and that should be the end of the matter.43 The crux of the 
dissent’s argument is that nonresidents of Kentucky should not be afforded the 
protections of the public policy of Kentucky merely because they got into an accident 
in Kentucky.44  
 
32 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marley, 151 S.W.3d 33, 34, 36 (Ky. 2004). 
33 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hodgkiss-Warrick, 413 S.W.3d 875, 882, 885 (Ky. 2013) 
(concluding that the Marley rationale was only applicable in limited circumstances: “Where no Kentucky 
resident has been affected, rarely will [the public policy exception] be met.”); see also Georgel v. Preece, 
No. 13-57-DLB-EBA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154678, at *22 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 30, 2014) (“[T]he Court sees 
no plausible basis for applying a public policy exception to the standard choice of law framework.”).  
34 Marley, 151 S.W.3d at 34.  
35 Id.  
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 35 
38 Id. at 36.  
39 Id.  
40 See id. (“This claim arises from the ownership, operation, and use of a motor vehicle within 
Kentucky . . . .”). 
41 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hodgkiss-Warrick, 413 S.W.3d 875, 885, 887 (Ky. 2013); 
Georgel v. Preece, No. 13-57-DLB-EBA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154678, *at 22 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 30, 2014) 
(“[T]he Court sees no plausible basis for applying a public policy exception to the standard choice of law 
framework.”). 
42 Marley, 151 S.W.3d at 41 (Cooper, J., dissenting). 
43 Id. 
44 See id. at 40 (Cooper, J., dissenting). 
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In support of this view, the dissent makes two main arguments. First, the dissent 
argues generally that extending the public policy exception to out-of-state residents 
encourages forum shopping, which, itself, violates the public policy of Kentucky.45 
Second, and more related to the facts of the case at hand, the dissent contends that a 
majority of other jurisdictions have held such household exclusion clauses 
enforceable “if valid where the policy was issued and where the parties reside even 
if invalid in the state where the accident occurred.”46 
On their face, the dissent’s arguments in support of denying the public policy 
exception to out-of-state residents are both logical and well-reasoned. It is true that 
a majority of other jurisdictions have held these clauses enforceable if valid where 
the policy was issued, even if the clauses were invalid in the state where the accident 
occurred.47 It is likewise true that forum shopping is against the public policy of 
Kentucky.48 Logical as these arguments may be, however, they suffer two critical 
flaws.  
First, the dissent’s “everyone else is doing it” argument overlooks, as many other 
jurisdictions have, the fact that routinely applying this exception for the protection 
of in-state residents while consistently denying its applicability to similarly-situated 
nonresidents implicates the Equal Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause 
unequivocally commands that no state shall “deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”49 The public policy exception clearly 
constitutes law, and it certainly provides protection for those whom it is invoked 
for.50  Accordingly, it is difficult to see how the Equal Protection Clause could be 
read to require anything other than that Kentucky courts apply the protections of the 
public policy exception equally to residents and nonresidents in Kentucky.  
Second, the dissent’s forum-shopping argument overlooks the Supremacy 
Clause. As explained above, it is hard to see how the Equal Protection Clause could 
be read to not require Kentucky courts to apply the protections of the public policy 
exception equally to residents and nonresidents alike. The dissent’s argument that 
applying the public policy exception to non-residents would violate state law of 
preventing forum-shopping therefore creates a direct conflict of laws between the 
 
45 Id. at 41 (Cooper, J., dissenting). 
46 Id. at 42 (Cooper, J., dissenting).. 
47 See, e.g., Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 839 F. Supp. 579, 583 (S.D. Ind. 1993) (upholding 
exclusion clause under Indiana law even though accident occurred in Kansas where exclusion was 
invalid); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hart, 611 A.2d 100, 103–04 (Md. 1992) (upholding exclusion clause under 
Florida law even though accident occurred in Maryland where exclusion violated public policy); Sotirakis 
v. United Serv. Auto. Ass’n., 787 P.2d 788, 790–91 (Nev. 1990) (upholding exclusion clause under 
California law even though accident occurred in Nevada where exclusion was invalid); Draper v. Draper, 
772 P.2d 180, 183 (Idaho 1989) (upholding exclusion clause under Oregon law even though accident 
occurred in New Mexico where exclusion was invalid).  
48 See, e.g., Stewart v. Kentuckiana Med. Ctr., 604 S.W.3d 264, 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019). 
49 U.S. CONST.  amend. XIV. 
50 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hodgkiss-Warrick, 413 S.W.3d 875, 881 (Ky. 2013) 
(“[P]ublic policy, invoked to bar the enforcement of a contract, is not simply something courts establish 
from general considerations of supposed public interest, but rather something that must be found clearly 
expressed in the applicable law.”) (emphasis added).  
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U.S. Constitution and state law. In situations such as this, the Supremacy Clause 
commands that the U.S. Constitution prevail over state law.51 
 
B. DENIAL OF PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO NONRESIDENTS 
 
In the 2013 decision of Hodgkiss-Warrick,52 the Kentucky Supreme Court 
implicitly changed its view on the applicability of the public policy exception to out-
of-state residents. In that case, a Pennsylvania resident sued to recover for injuries 
sustained in an automobile collision while riding with her daughter on a Kentucky 
roadway.53 The suit named the injured Pennsylvania resident’s insurance company 
as defendant, alleging insufficient motorist coverage under a policy issued in 
Pennsylvania and covering a vehicle registered and used exclusively in 
Pennsylvania.54 The policy at issue contained an exclusion prohibiting the injured 
Pennsylvania resident from recovering damages arising out of an accident involving 
an automobile used by a resident relative, including the Pennsylvania resident’s 
daughter.55  
While conceding that under traditional conflict-of-law analysis Pennsylvania law 
would govern the interpretation of the insurance policy, the Pennsylvania resident 
argued that the exclusion of her daughter’s vehicle from the policy’s coverage would 
so violate the public policy of Kentucky that Kentucky law, rather than Pennsylvania 
law, must apply.56 Under Kentucky law, the Appellee argued that such exclusions 
from insurance policies are unenforceable as against Kentucky public policy.57  
Although the court found that the exclusion at issue did not, in fact, run afoul of 
Kentucky public policy, the court acknowledged that, even if it did, the public policy 
exception would nevertheless be inapplicable to the facts of this case.58 The court 
reasoned that in order for the public policy exception to bar enforcement of a 
contractual provision that is valid where made, the Kentucky public policy against 
such enforcement must be significant.59 According to the court, a public policy is 
only substantial if it is a “well-founded rule of domestic policy established to protect 
the morals, safety or welfare of our people.”60 “Where no Kentucky resident has been 
affected,” the court continued, “rarely will that standard be met.”61  
Following the logic of Hodgkiss-Warrick, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Kentucky, applying Kentucky law, similarly declined to invoke the public 
policy exception for the benefit of a Kentucky nonresident in the 2014 case of 
 
51 U.S. CONST.  art. VI, cl. 2. 
52 Hodgkiss-Warrick, 413 S.W.3d 875.  
53 Id. at 876. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 878.  
56 Id. at 878, 879. 
57 Id. at 878. 
58 See id. at 882–83.  
59 Id. at 882.  
60 Id. (quoting R.S. Barbee & Co. v. Bevins, Hopkins & Co. 195 S.W. 154, 155 (Ky. 1917)).  
61 Id. 
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Georgel v. Preece.62 Georgel involved an accident between a West Virginia resident 
and a Kentucky resident on a Kentucky roadway.63 Georgel, the West Virginia 
resident, filed suit against Preece, the Kentucky resident, as well as Preece’s 
insurance company seeking damages for injuries he sustained as a result of the 
accident.64 Georgel’s insurance company countered that Georgel’s own comparative 
fault precluded Georgel from recovery.65 Because West Virginia law encompasses 
the doctrine of modified comparative negligence, which bars a plaintiff who is fifty 
percent or more responsible from recovery, Georgel’s chances of recovery were far 
less viable in West Virginia than in Kentucky.66 
In its application of the “most significant relationship” test, the court ultimately 
concluded that West Virginia had the most significant relationship to the transaction 
and the parties and, therefore, West Virginia law should apply.67 Georgel urged the 
court to apply the public policy exception, arguing that Kentucky has a strong, 
clearly-established public policy of recognizing pure comparative fault.68 Georgel 
explained that the purpose behind Kentucky’s doctrine of pure comparative fault is 
“to promote the policy of allowing injured persons to recover despite being partially 
responsible for their own injuries.”69 If the court were to apply West Virginia law, 
Georgel argued, he would be denied the policy’s benefit.70 
But Georgel’s pleas fell on deaf ears due to the simple fact that Georgel was not 
a resident of Kentucky.71 In declining to extend the public policy exception, the court 
distinguished a prior case recognizing this public policy on the sole basis that in that 
case the party who stood to benefit from Kentucky law was a Kentucky resident, 
whereas Georgel was not.72 In addition to the court’s reliance on Hodgkiss-Warrick, 
the court also cited the dissenting opinion in Marley for the proposition that 
Kentucky has no interest in applying its public policy to provide benefits to out-of-
state residents who would not be entitled to such benefits in their own state of 
residence.73  
 
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
 
As addressed above, Kentucky courts’ denial of the public policy exception to 
nonresidents implicates the Equal Protection Clause. To be sure, the Clause is 
implicated whenever a government action draws a distinction between groups of 
people and provides one group more or less protection under the law than the other 
 
62 Georgel v. Preece, No. 13-57-DLB-EBA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154678, at *18–19, *21–22 (E.D. 
Ky. Oct. 30, 2014). 
63 Id. at *2.  
64 Id. at *2–3.  
65 Id. at *3. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at *16–17.  
68 Id. at *20.  
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
71 Id. at *20–21.  
72 Id.  
73 Id. at *21 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marley, 151 S.W.3d 33, 42 (Ky. 2004)). 
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group.74 Here, in the context of conflict-of-law disputes, Kentucky courts have drawn 
a distinction between Kentucky residents and nonresidents and afforded Kentucky 
residents greater protection under the law by only invoking the public policy 
exception on their behalf. The Equal Protection Clause is implicated by this 
residency-based discrimination, and the question next becomes the appropriate level 
of scrutiny for constitutional review.75 
Typically, laws or government actions which draw such classifications between 
groups of people will survive judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause so 
long as the classification is “rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”76 
This standard is known as rational basis review, and it is used to analyze government 
regulations, laws, or actions involving classifications that do not implicate an 
immutable characteristic (e.g., race, national origin, aliens, gender) or encroach on a 
fundamental right (i.e., rights specifically recognized by the Supreme Court as 
granted by the Constitution).77 This is a relatively lenient standard in which the 
government is normally—though not always—given a significant amount of 
deference.78 
In the context of Kentucky’s denial of its public policy exception to nonresidents, 
rational basis review is likely the proper standard of constitutional scrutiny. The 
classification made by Kentucky courts in this regard is based on state of residency, 
which is not an immutable characteristic warranting a higher level of scrutiny.79 
Likewise, it is unlikely that the denial of the public policy exception to nonresidents 
interferes impermissibly with the exercise of a fundamental right—at least under 
traditional Equal Protection Clause analysis.80 Even under rational basis review, 
however, courts will strike down laws or governmental actions if there is simply no 
plausible legitimate state interest for the state to advance.81  
 
74 See Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent 
Interpretation and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L. J. 219, 220 (2009). 
75 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 727 (Wolters Kluwer eds., 5th ed. 2017).  
76 See id. at 728 (“Rational basis review is the minimum level of scrutiny that all laws challenged 
under equal protection must meet. All laws not subjected to strict or intermediate scrutiny are evaluated 
under the rational basis test.”).  
77 See, e.g., Colin Callahan & Amelia Kaufman, Equal Protection, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 17, 23, 26 
(2004).  
78 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 728.  
79 Id. (“The notion [that immutable characteristics warrant heightened scrutiny] is [predicated on the 
fact] that it is unfair to penalize a person for characteristics that the person did not choose and that the 
individual cannot change.”).  
80 Id. at 730. Cf. Part III, infra pp. 12–14 (discussing the possibility under Privileges and Immunities 
Clause analysis that the distinction encroaches on the fundamental right to equal protection of the laws). 
The only other fundamental right which could possibly be encroached by the denial of the public policy 
exception is the fundamental right to travel. The Supreme Court has made clear that “freedom to travel 
throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.” Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (citation omitted). Thus far, however, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence concerning the fundamental right to travel has primarily concerned state durational 
residency requirements. See id. at 334; Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 900–01, 907 
(1986). Since the denial of the public policy exception is not a durational residency requirement, it is 
unlikely such a denial implicates any fundamental right as to require strict scrutiny.  
81 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 728.  
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In Romer v. Evans, for example, the Court struck down under rational basis 
review a Colorado Constitutional Amendment which precluded any judicial, 
legislative, or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based 
on their sexual orientation.82 The State’s proffered interest in adopting the 
Amendment was the protection of “the liberties of landlords or employers who have 
personal or religious objections to homosexuality.”83 In declining to deem this 
interest legitimate, the Court reasoned that if equal protection of the laws means 
anything, “it must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.”84 
Similarly, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward, the Court used 
rational basis review to strike down an Alabama law which attempted to promote the 
growth of an in-state insurance industry by taxing in-state companies at much lower 
rates than out-of-state companies doing business in the State.85 The Court found the 
State’s preferred interest to be “purely and completely discriminatory,” and 
accordingly deemed the law the “very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal 
Protection Clause was intended to prevent.”86   
Based on the language of the Kentucky opinions denying the public policy 
exception to out-of-state residents, there appear to be two state interests Kentucky 
could advance in support of making this distinction. First, Kentucky could argue that 
it has a legitimate state interest in declining to “provide rights to nonresidents to 
which they are not entitled in their home state.”87 It is difficult to distinguish such an 
interest from the impermissible state interest offered by the Colorado government in 
Romer, as it seems to be more of a bare desire to disfavor a particular group of people 
within the Kentucky’s borders than an effort to advance a bona-fide interest for the 
benefit of the Commonwealth.  
Though Kentucky’s inequal application of its public policy exception harms a 
group of people less directly than the Colorado constitutional amendment did in 
Romer (which is perhaps part of the reason why such practices have escaped 
Constitutional scrutiny thus far), the practical effect is the same. In both instances, 
the government action singles out a particular group with little political power 
(homosexual Colorado citizens in Romer) or no political power (nonresidents who 
properly bring suit in Kentucky) within a state and disadvantages that group.88 
Accordingly, it seems plausible that even under rational basis review this interest 
would fail to qualify as legitimate.   
Alternatively, Kentucky could argue that it has a legitimate state interest in 
refusing to disrupt the balance of public policies that other states have chosen for 
their citizens.89 Here too, though, it is uncertain whether such an interest would 
 
82 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24, 635 (1996).  
83 Id. at 635. 
84 Id. at 634 (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
85 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882–83 (1985). 
86 Id. at 878. 
87 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marley, 151 S.W.3d 33, 41 (Ky. 2004) (Cooper, J., dissenting).  
88 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
89 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hodgkiss-Warrick, 413 S.W.3d 875, 883 (Ky. 2013) 
(explaining that “nothing requires a Kentucky court to interfere with the balance Pennsylvania has chosen 
for its citizens.”) (citation omitted).  
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qualify as legitimate, as there appears to be no case law even remotely on point. 
Logically speaking, however, one major flaw in this argument is that Kentucky has 
no issue overriding the balance of public policies and substantive laws that another 
state has chosen for its residents when doing so protects a Kentucky resident.90  
Furthermore, such a disparate treatment of non-residents who properly bring suit 
in Kentucky could be analogized, albeit imperfectly, to Alabama’s “purely and 
completely discriminatory” treatment of out-of-state companies doing business in 
Alabama as in Ward.91 Just as the Supreme Court there deemed the State’s interest 
in discriminating against out-of-state companies in order to protect domestic growth 
to be illegitimate,92 the Supreme Court could likewise hold Kentucky’s interest in 
declining to disrupt the balance of policies chosen by other states for their residents, 
except when doing so would benefit a Kentucky resident, to be insufficient. 
Accordingly, it seems quite plausible Kentucky’s practice of denying its public 
policy exception to nonresidents could fail even the most deferential standard of 
constitutional scrutiny.  
 
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY UNDER PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 
 
Article IV, Section 2 of the United States Constitution requires that “[t]he 
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens 
in the several States.”93 Historically, the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been 
used primarily to protect rights which are either fundamental or involve important 
economic activities.94  
The most obvious privileges and immunities, for example, are constitutional 
rights,95 such as the right to own and dispose of property,96 or the right to pursue “a 
common calling.”97 By the same token, the right to engage in a particular trade or 
profession, or to pay an equal licensing fee as residents for certain commercial 
activities, also qualify as privileges and immunities under the clause.98 Rights which 
are not considered fundamental, such as the right to hunt for sport, for example, do 
not qualify as privileges and immunities.99 
 
90 See, e.g., Woods v. Std. Fire Ins. Co., 411 F. Supp. 3d 397, 404 (E.D. Ky. 2019); Schardein v. State 
Auto. Ins. Co., No. 12-288-C, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180746 *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 21, 2012). 
91 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 869 (1985). 
92 Id. 
93 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
94 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 75, at 476.  
95 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (“What more precious ‘privilege’ of American 
citizenship could there be than that privilege to claim the protections of our great Bill of Rights?”). 
96 Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 249 (1998). 
97 United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219 (1984) (“[T]he pursuit of a 
common calling is one of the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the [Privileges and 
Immunities] Clause.”). 
98 Sup. Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281 (1985) (discussing the privileges and immunities clause 
in terms of a particular trade); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (discussing the privileges and 
immunities clause in terms of paying an equal licensing fee). 
99 Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S 371, 388 (1978) (holding that elk hunting by 
nonresidents in Montana was not a fundamental right under the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 
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In the context of conflicts-of-law, the Privileges and Immunities Clause has a 
particularly curious history. While Supreme Court justices have acknowledged the 
inherent overlap between constitutional law and conflicts-of-law principles,100 the 
modern Court has never heard a Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge to a 
state conflicts-of-law rule.101 In fact, the Court has not invalidated a state conflict-
of-law decision under any constitutional provision since 1951.102 This is true despite 
the fact that conflict-of-law rules that give preference to local litigants constitute a 
“prima facie” violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause under even the most 
liberal reading of the Clause’s text.103 
     But for some reason, the Supreme Court has steered clear of this convoluted 
intersection of law for more than a half-century, leaving its resolution entirely to state 
courts and legal theorists.104 The result of leaving this power with the states has, 
predictably, resulted in a system by which local discrimination against nonresidents 
often escapes judicial review.105  
     In the context of Kentucky only applying its public policy exception for the 
protection of Kentucky residents, for example, certain residents of other states who 
lawfully bring suit in Kentucky are denied Kentucky’s favorable policies. Truthfully, 
it is less than clear exactly what constitutes a “privilege” or “immunity” under the 
Clause as to warrant constitutional protection against discrimination on the basis of 
state residency.106 But because Kentucky advances these policies for the protection 
of Kentucky residents, its denial to residents of other states at least arguably deprives 
those citizens of a fundamental right or “privilege” under the clause—the 
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.  
      As one prominent legal theorist put it, “if the state’s conflicts rules provides 
that a local right will prevail in a particular case when asserted by a local, that right 
must prevail when asserted in the same case by an out-of-state[] [resident], unless 
there is some nondiscriminatory reason why it should not.”107 The theorist continued, 
“[j]udicious use of garden-variety antidiscrimination principles embedded in the . . . 
Privileges and Immunities Clause,” would prevent such local favoritism by states.108 
      Yet, because the Supreme Court refuses to address this issue, states are 
permitted to continue discriminating against nonresidents through conflict-of-law 
rules in ways that run afoul of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.109 For this 
reason, it is crucial for states like Kentucky who employ these rules to recognize the 
 
100 See Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1945). 
101 Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations 
of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 257 (1992). 
102 Id.; Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951) (holding that a state’s refusal to enforce the law of 
the state where the injury occurred violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
103 Laycock, supra note 101, at 265.  
104 Id. at 258–59. 
105 See id. at 268, 278. 
106 E.g., Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm’n., 436 U.S. 371, 380 (1978) (noting that “the contours of 
[the Privileges and Immunities Clause] are not well developed”). 
107 Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 
2517 (1999). 
108 Id. at 2453. 
109 Laycock, supra note 101, at 268, 278. 
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constitutional ramifications of their actions and lead the way in shifting towards a 
less-discriminatory body of law. If Kentucky were to reconcile its conflicts-of-law 
rules with the U.S. Constitution, the Commonwealth would be taking a significant 
step towards achieving the Framers’ core purpose in drafting the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.110 
 
IV. KENTUCKY COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
WITHOUT REGARD TO RESIDENCY 
 
Given the constitutional issues surrounding conflicts-of-law practices in 
Kentucky, Kentucky courts should apply its public policy exception equally to 
residents and nonresidents alike. For one, it is questionable whether Kentucky’s 
current practice of denying its public policy exception to out-of-state residents could 
survive even the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause.111 Secondly, such discriminatory behavior is precisely what the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause was drafted to protect against.112 
     While it is true that the practice is unlikely to be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court in the near future,113 Kentucky should nevertheless lead the way in exercising 
constitutionally compliant conflicts-of-law rules. To be sure, equal protection in the 
courts between residents and nonresidents alike was a vital part of the Framers’ 
understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.114 Further, the plain text of 
the Equal Protection Clause requires that no person (whether or not that person is a 
citizen, noncitizen, resident or nonresident) within a state’s jurisdiction be denied 
equal protection of the laws of that state.115  
In order for nonresidents who properly bring suit in Kentucky to receive equal 
protection in this context, they must be governed by “equal application of equal 
laws.”116  By embedding within its conflicts-of-law rules an exception, which can 
only be used for the protection of Kentucky residents, Kentucky courts violate this 




     In sum, by denying out-of-state residents, who properly bring suit in 
Kentucky, certain legal protections afforded to in-state residents, Kentucky’s 
application of the public policy exception to the Restatement (Second) Conflicts of 
Law test is at odds with both the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution.  If Kentucky courts wish to 
continue overriding the Commonwealth’s conflicts-of-law principles with public 
 
110 Id. at 266. 
111 See Part II, supra pp. 9–12. 
112 Laycock, supra note 101, at 266. 
113 See id. at 257 (noting that the Court has not invalidated a state conflict-of-law decision under any 
constitutional provision since 1951). 
114 Laycock, supra note 101, at 266. 
115 U.S. CONST.  amend. XIV (emphasis added). 
116 Laycock, supra note 101, at 266. 
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policy, they should do so without regard to the claimant’s residency. By continuing 
to apply the public policy exception in a way that favors only local litigants, 
Kentucky courts set the dangerous precedent of ignoring some of the United States’ 
most fundamental laws. 
